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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to decide this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(i) (Supp. 1994).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in the amount of

alimony it awarded to Ms. Penrose.

The standard of appellate

review is a "clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion."

Paffel v.

Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986); accord Chambers v. Chambers,
840 P.2d 841 (Utah Ct.App. 1992).
2.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in its valuation

and division of property and debts awarded to the parties.
standard

of

appellate

review

is a clear

The

abuse of discretion.

Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598 (Utah Ct.App. 1994).
3.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in the amount of

child support it awarded to Ms. Penrose for the benefit of the
parties* minor child.
abuse of discretion.

The standard of appellate review is a clear
Jensen v. Bowcut, 892 P.2d 1053 (Utah Ct.App.

1995).
4.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by not awarding

Ms. Penrose any of her attorney fees and costs.

The standard of

appellate review is a clear abuse of discretion.

Wells v. Wells,

871 P.2d 1036 (Utah Ct.App. 1994).
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
1.

Utah Code Ann, § 30-3-5.

See Addendum A for a complete

recitation of that section.
3.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.12.

See Addendum

A for a

See Addendum

A

See Addendum

A for a

complete recitation of that section.
4.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.14.

for a

complete recitation of that section.
5.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7(3).

complete recitation of that section.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Course of Proceedings.
Karen Penrose ("Ms.

Penrose") filed for divorce on

June 8,

1993, to dissolve her thirteen year marriage to Jeffrey Penrose
("Mr. Penrose").

The case was tried before Judge Sandra N. Peuler

in the Third Judicial District Court on June 14, 15, and 16, 1995.
The court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Decree of Divorce on October 18, 1995.

The Decree of Divorce

provided for the following:
1.
minor son.

The parties were awarded joint legal custody of their
Ms. Penrose was awarded primary physical custody.

Mr.

Penrose was awarded reasonable rights of visitation.
2.

Mr. Penrose was ordered

amount of $669.00 per month.
3

to pay child

support in the

3.

Mr. Penrose was ordered to pay alimony for an indefinite

period of time in the amount of $1,331.00 per month.
4.

Mr. Penrose was awarded the parties' business, Designers

Carpet Showroom.
maintained

The parties divided approximately

$178,000.00

in an escrow account from the sale of the parties'

marital residence, of which Ms. Penrose ultimately was awarded
$109,000.00, and Mr. Penrose was awarded $69,000.00.

Mr. Penrose

was awarded a Bronco valued at $8,000.00, two snowmobiles at a
combined valued of $13,000.00, and a trailer valued at $2,000.00.
Ms. Penrose was awarded a BMW which she leases.

The court ascribed

a value of $12,000.00 to the BMW, the value of the vehicle Ms.
Penrose

sold

$69,000.00

to

obtain

Certificate

the BMW.
of

Deposit

Mr.

Penrose

which

the

$29,000.00 for purposes of property division.

was

court

awarded
valued

a
at

The parties' 40%

interest in Utah Water Sports was divided equally, with no present
value

ascribed.

The

court

ordered

Mr.

Penrose

to

repay

a

$40,000.00 debt to his grandmother, and Ms. Penrose to repay all
debts to her father, which total over $100,000.00.
5.

The parties were ordered to bear their own attorneys fees

and costs.
On November 13, 1995, Ms. Penrose filed her Notice of Appeal.
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B.

Statement of Facts,
1.

The parties were married on August 24, 1982, in Salt Lake

City, Utah,

and

divorced

approximately 13 years.
2.

on October

18, 1995, a marriage

of

(Exhibit A 1f 2; Tr. Vol. I, p. 21).

At the time of trial, Ms. Penrose was 34 years old.

(Tr.

Vol. I, p. 23).
3.

During the marriage the parties had one child, a son,

born as issue of the marriage.
six years of age.
4.
son,

with

At the time of trial, their son was

(Tr. Vol. I, p. 21).

The parties were awarded joint legal custody of their
primary

physical

custody

awarded

to

Ms.

Penrose.

(Exhibit B 1[ 2) .
5.

Ms. Penrose's role within the family since the birth of

their son has primarily been that of full-time wife and mother.
(Exhibit A 1f 5; Tr. Vol. I, p. 27).
6.

Ms. Penrose is not employed, and has not been employed

since the birth of the parties' son, with the sole exception of
limited unpaid work performed for the parties' business, Designer's
Carpet Showroom. (Exhibit A if 5; Tr. Vol. I, p. 27).
7.

Ms. Penrose's post-high

approximately

school education consists of

one year of college and a study abroad

(Exhibit A 1f 5; Tr. Vol. I, pp. 24-25).

5

program.

8.

Ms. Penrose has been advised by her physician that she

will require significant surgery in the foreseeable future.

(Tr.

Vol. I, pp. 34-35).
9.

Approximately one month after their marriage, the parties

moved to Hawaii, where they began and operated a jet ski rental
business.

They

sold

the

business

in

1988

for

$350,000.00.2

(Exhibit A V 5; Tr. Vol. I, p. 44).
10.

After

the

purchase

of

the

parties'

next

business,

Designers Carpet Showroom, in 1988, Ms. Penrose's primary source of
income was money given to her by Mr. Penrose. (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 3334).
11.

Despite

evidence

presented

by

Ms.

Penrose

that

her

current monthly expenses, for herself and the parties' minor son,
totalled $5,974.04, the court found that Ms. Penrose's "reasonable"
monthly expenses were approximately $3,800.
12.

(Exhibit A. 1F 9 ) .

Despite the fact that Ms. Penrose had not been employed

on a full-time basis since the birth of the parties1 son, the court
found that she could obtain full-time work at approximately $7.00
per

hour.

The

court

further

found

that

Ms.

Penrose

could

contribute approximately $900.00 net per month to her own living

There is some discrepancy as to what amount the Penroses
actually received from the sale.
Ms. Penrose testified to
$80,000.00, Mr. Penrose testified to $60,000.00. (Tr. Vol. I, p.
44; Tr. Vol. II, p. 267).
6

expenses.

The

court

also

found

that

Ms.

Penrose

received

approximately $900.00 per month from stock accounts.
(Exhibit A If 5 ) .
13.

The court established Mr. Penrose's gross monthly income

at $8,932.00.
14.

(Exhibit A If 5 ) .

Mr. Penrose's income allowed the parties to acquire a

home with a resale value of $500,000.00, as well as items such as
two snowmobiles, and luxury automobiles including a Porsche 914,
purchased for approximately $30,000.00, and a Mercedes-Benz 560SL
convertible, purchased for approximately $50,000.00.

(Tr. Vol. I.,

pp. 73-74).
15.
extensive

The parties enjoyed

a luxurious

lifestyle,

including

travel to Europe, Asia, California, Hawaii, and

the

Caribbean, frequent snowmobiling and waterskiing trips, and season
tickets to Utah Jazz basketball games, at a cost of approximately
$2,200.00 per year.
16.

(Tr. Vol. I, p. 77, 79).

Mr. Penrose's

significant

amount

of

income enabled
money

on

Ms. Penrose

personal

approximately $2,500.00 per month on clothing.

items,

to spend a
including

Ms. Penrose also

had regular manicure and haircare appointments, custom designed
furniture, and outside assistance with childcare and housework.
The parties purchased significant gifts for each other, including

7

jewelry, furs, artwork, and electronic equipment.

(Tr. Vol. I, pp.

77-78, 149-155).
17.

Although Mr. Lloyd Hansen, Ms. Penrose's father, did

contribute to the parties' income from time to time, particularly
while

they

marriage,

were
Mr.

living

Penrose's

in

Hawaii

Mr.

the

income provided

luxuries and lifestyle they enjoyed.
18.

at

beginning

the

parties

of

their

with

the

(Tr. Vol. II, pp. 384-388).

Based upon a monthly income of $8,932.00, the court fixed

Penrose's

monthly

child

support

obligation

at

$669.00.

(Exhibit B 1f 3) .
19.

The court likewise found that due to the fact that Ms.

Penrose has been out of the job market for a number of years, and
considering Mr. Penrose's income, Ms. Penrose was to be awarded
permanent alimony; (Exhibit A 1f 9) but that she could contribute
approximately $1,200.00 per month toward her own support.

(Exhibit

A If 5 ) .
20.

Despite

the fact that

(i) Ms. Penrose

has not

been

employed outside the home since the parties' move to Utah, with the
exception of limited work at the parties' business (Exhibit A 1f ;
Tr, Vol. I, pp.

); (ii) Ms. Penrose has very

limited

formal

training and education (Exhibit A If 5; Tr. Vol. I, pp. 24-25);
(iii) Ms. Penrose's documented monthly obligations total in excess
of $5,974.04 (Tr. Vol. I, p. 204); (iv) Mr. Penrose has monthly
8

expenses that are insignificant in amount (Tr. Vol. II, p. 388);
(v) Mr. Penrose's monthly income was found to be $8,932.00 (Exhibit
A 1f 5 ) ; the trial court awarded Ms. Penrose alimony in the amount
of only $1,331.00 per month (Exhibit A If 9) .
21.

Pursuant to the stipulation of the parties, the parties'

business, Designers Carpet Showroom, was valued at $194,000.00.
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 136).
22.

The

Penrose.
value,"

court

awarded

Designers

Carpet

Despite the fact that the business
the court valued

the business

Showroom
"has

to Mr.

significant

"at $0 for purposes of

distributing the parties' property," due to a tax liability, the
amount of which has not yet been conclusively determined.

(Exhibit

A ir 13(a) ).
23.

The court ordered Mr. Penrose to repay a $40,000.00 debt

to his grandmother from the proceeds of a $69,000.00 Certificate of
Deposit awarded to Mr. Penrose.
24.

(Exhibit A 1f 13(c)).

The court ordered Ms. Penrose to repay all debts to her

father, which total $107,891.31, but did not grant her an asset
with which to do so.
25.
awarded

(Tr. Vol. I, p. 170; Exhibit A 1f 14).

The court valued the $69,000.00 Certificate of Deposit
to Mr. Penrose at $29,000.00 for purposes of property

distribution

due

to

the

offset

9

in

the

amount

of

$40,000.00

represented

by

the

debt

owing

to

Mr.

Penrose's

grandmother.

(Exhibit A If 13 (c) ).
26.

The court divided approximately $178,000.00 maintained in

an escrow account from the sale of the parties' marital residence
between

the

parties.

Ms.

Penrose

ultimately

$109,000.00, and Mr. Penrose was awarded $69,000.00.

was

awarded

(Exhibit A,

V 13(g)).
27.

Mr. Penrose was awarded a Bronco valued at $8,000.00, two

snowmobiles at a combined valued of $13,000.00, and a trailer
valued at $2,000.00.

Ms. Penrose was awarded a BMW which she

leases, for which a value of $12,000.00 was ascribed.

(Exhibit A,

If 13(g)).
28.

The court ordered both parties to pay their own attorney

fees and costs.

(Exhibit A 1[ 15).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The trial court clearly abused its discretion in four areas.
First, the amount of alimony awarded to Ms. Penrose is insufficient
to allow her to continue the standard of living enjoyed during the
course of the marriage.

The evidence at trial established that Mr.

Penrose's income, which did not change substantially during the
course of the marriage, allowed the parties to become accustomed to
a

lifestyle

travel.

that included

luxury homes, cars,

and

substantial

Ms. Penrose, who acquired few marketable skills, is unable
10

to continue this standard of living on the trial court's alimony
award of only $1,331.00 per month.

In addition, the alimony award

does not achieve parity of income between the parties.
Second, the property distribution and division of debts is
inequitable and constitutes an abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial court.

The court required both parties to repay debts to

family members; however, it granted only Mr. Penrose an asset with
which to do so, despite the fact that Ms. Penrose's debt to her
father is much larger, and Mr. Penrose has much greater earning
capacity.

The valuation of the property awarded is erroneous; the

Certificate of Deposit awarded Mr. Penrose was valued

at only

$29,000.00, despite its face value of $69,000.00, and the parties'
business was valued at $0, despite its history of steady growth and
increasing income.
Third, the child support award is inadequate in light of Mr.
Penrose's established monthly income of $8,932.00 per month, and
the parties' combined income of $11,032.00 per month.
Finally, the trial court erred in requiring the parties to
bear their own attorney fees and costs without considering the
factors required by Utah law; specifically, Ms. Penrose's need, Mr.
Penrose's ability to pay, and the reasonableness of the fees.
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ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN SETTING THE ALIMONY AWARD
A.

THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ALIMONY FAILS TO ENABLE MS.
PENROSE TO MAINTAIN THE SAME STANDARD OF LIVING SHE
ENJOYED DURING THE PARTIES1 MARRIAGE

Utah courts have clearly set forth the purposes of an award of
alimony.

The paramount purpose is to:

enabl[e] the receiving spouse to maintain, as nearly as
possible, the standard of living enjoyed during the
marriage, and preventing the receiving spouse from
becoming a public charge.
Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 121 (Ut.Ct.App. 1990).
Although there are circumstances where there is simply not
enough to go around, that is not the case here.

The court made the

express finding that Mr. Penrose had a monthly income of $8,932.00.
That income allowed the parties to acquire substantial assets,
including a successful business which the parties built together,
a home valued

at $500,000.00, snowmobiles, luxury automobiles,

substantial travel, and luxurious gifts.
The evidence further established that Mr. Penrose's personal
expenses were minimal in amount.

At the time of the divorce, he

was not making any mortgage payments or car payments, and had a
rent obligation of approximately $300.00 per month.

Finally, the

evidence established that Ms. Penrose's monthly expenses totalled
12

not less than $5,974.04, and that she lacked formal training or
education, and had been dependent on Mr. Penrose for support since
the birth of the parties' son.
Mr. Penrose's income, which allowed the parties to enjoy a
well-to-do standard of living, had not materially diminished during
the course of the marriage, nor had Mr. Penrose incurred expenses
which would materially affect his ability to provide support for
Ms. Penrose.

Ms. Penrose, on the other hand, is not capable of

providing any significant level of support for herself, certainly
not a level sufficient to meet her established monthly needs.
Simply stated, the Penroses established a very comfortable
standard of living during their marriage which Ms. Penrose is not
capable of maintaining on her own. Mr. Penrose, however, continues
to be able to provide Ms. Penrose the financial support necessary
to allow her to continue her established lifestyle.

Mr. Penrose's

established income, and the parties' established marital standard
of living are undisputed.

Accordingly, there is no reason why Ms.

Penrose is not entitled to a continuation of the same level of
support she enjoyed during the marriage.
The only remaining question is whether the trial court's award
is sufficient to provide Ms. Penrose the alimony to which she is
legally and factually entitled.

The answer is an unequivocal no!

The trial court found that Ms. Penrose's average monthly expenses
13

were approximately $3,800.00, despite the fact that the evidence
established

that her monthly expenses, based upon her marital

standard of living, totalled not less than $5,974.04.

The court

offered no explanation for this reduction, stating only that Ms.
Penrose's claimed expenses were "excessive."
The

court

failed

to

address

that

fact

(Exhibit "A," If 9 ) .
that

Ms.

Penrose's

uncontroverted2 testimony established expenses of $5,974.04.

The

court's award of a total level of support of $2,000.00 per month
($669.00 in child support and $1,331.00 in alimony) is clearly
inadequate to allow Ms. Penrose to maintain her marital standard of
living.

The

trial

court's

inadequate

award

is

particularly

objectionable in light of the fact that Mr. Penrose's income is
sufficient to allow Ms. Penrose to do so.
In Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Ut.Ct.App. 1991), this
Court affirmed that, in allowing the receiving spouse to maintain
the marital standard of living, the alimony award should also be
based upon the receiving spouse's station in life and the payor
spouse's ability to pay.

This Court found that

the court should set alimony . . . to approximate the
parties' standard of living during the marriage as
closely as possible.
If follows that if the payor
spouse's resources are adequate, alimony need not be
2

Although Mr. Penrose stated that he thought some of Ms.
Penrose's claimed expenses were "high," he offered no support for
this conclusion, and had not seen any of her bills. (Tr. Vol. II,
p. 244-246.
14

limited to provide for only basic needs, but should also
consider the recipient spouse's "station in life."
Id.

at

1212;

see

also

Sampinos

v.

Sampinos,

750

P.2d

615

(Ut.Ct.App. 1988) (alimony award should be affirmed to allow wife
of twelve years to maintain her marital standard of living, in
light of the fact that she had no professional training and few
marketable skills, and defendant was clearly able to pay); Morgan
v. Morgan, 854 P.2d 559 (Utah Ct.App. 1993) (alimony award upheld
where receiving spouse's role was that of homemaker, income from
property division would not allow her to maintain her marital
standard of living, and payor spouse had ability to pay).
Here,

the

trial

court

abused

its

discretion

by

awarding

alimony in an amount which will not allow Ms. Penrose to continue
her

marital

standard

of

living,

despite

Mr.

Penrose's

proven

ability to provide such support.
B.

THE ALIMONY AWARD FAILS TO EQUALIZE MR. PENROSE AND MS.
PENROSE'S STANDARDS OF LIVING

One of the primary objectives of an alimony
equalize

the

parties'

standards

of

living.

award

This

is to

Court

has

instructed that "alimony should, as far as possible, equalize the
parties' respective standards of living."

Munns v. Munns, 790 P. 2d

116, 121 (Utah Ct.App. 1991) (citing Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d
1144, 1146 (Ut.Ct.App. 1988)).

Here, the trial court's alimony

15

award fails to realize this goal, and leaves the parties with
grossly disproportionate standards of living.
Based upon a monthly gross income of $8,932.00, Mr. Penrose
will have a pre-tax disposable income of $6,932.00 after meeting
his child support and alimony obligations.

Ms. Penrose, on the

other hand, will have a pre-tax disposable income of $4,100.00,
based upon the trial court's total support award of $2,000.00, her
stock

income,

and

$1,200.00 per month.

the

trial

court's

imputed

gross

income

of

This is assuming, of course, that Ms. Penrose

is able to secure such employment.

The trial court's award, then,

leaves Mr. Penrose with approximately

$2,832.00 more than Ms.

Penrose in monthly gross income.
In determining an award of alimony in a divorce, the trial
court is obligated to divide the income equitably.

As the Utah

Supreme Court has plainly stated:
The overarching aim of a property division, and of the
decree of which it and the alimony award are subsidiary
parts, is to achieve a fair, just and equitable result
between the parties.
Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1988) (emphasis added)
See also Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 121 (Utah Ct.App. 1990) (one
of the primary considerations in achieving such fairness and equity
is to equalize the parties' respective standards of living).
This Court has not hesitated to remand alimony awards which
fail to equalize the parties' standards of living.
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In

Howell v.

Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct.App. 1991), the defendant testified
to monthly expenses of approximately $5,000.00.
a monthly

income of $10,000.00 per month.

The plaintiff had
The court

awarded

alimony and child support in the amount of $3,163.00, and found
that the defendant had the ability to earn a salary of $645.00 per
month.
This Court held that this award was insufficient, noting that,
M

[t]he alimony set by the court does not come close to equalizing

the parties' standard of living as of the time of the divorce, but
allows plaintiff a two to four times advantage."

Id. at 1213.

Here, Mr. Penrose receives almost $3,000.00 more gross income
per month than Ms. Penrose. Mr. Penrose earns a substantial salary
from his property award of a successful business.

He testified

that his monthly obligations are minimal, consisting mainly of
$300.00 per month

in rent.

Ms. Penrose, on the other

introduced evidence of a number of financial obligations.

hand,
The

inequity of the trial court's distribution of income is stark and
undeniable.
alone, and

The award of alimony must be overturned on this basis
an award

entered

which meets the required

equalizing the parties' standards of living.

17

goal of

II.
THE DIVISION OF MARITAL DEBTS AND PROPERTY IS INEQUITABLE
A.

THE DIVISION OF DEBTS IS INEQUITABLE

The

trial

court

abused

its discretion

by

directing

both

parties to repay debts to family members, and awarding Mr. Penrose
a $69,000.00 asset with which to do so, without doing the same for
Ms. Penrose.
The trial court directed Mr. Penrose to repay a $40,000.00
loan from his grandmother.
to her

Ms. Penrose was ordered to repay debts

father, which total over $100,000.00.

The court

then

awarded Mr. Penrose a certificate of deposit in the amount of
$69,000.00, and required him to repay his grandmother from that
asset.

However, the court gave Ms. Penrose no asset with which to

repay her $100,000.00 debt.

(Exhibit A, 1f 13(c), 14).

This division of debts is facially inequitable and a clear
abuse of the discretion by the trial court.

The evidence presented

at trial showed that Ms. Penrose had little formal education and
virtually no formal training.
years,

and,

should

She has not been employed for some

she be able

to

find

employment,

expected to earn only about $2,100.00 per month.
the other hand, earns a substantial salary.

could

be

Mr. Penrose, on

In Baker v. Baker, 866

P.2d 540 (Utah Ct.App. 1993), this Court noted that it is entirely
proper to consider the parties' relative income and earning power
18

when

dividing

" f [T]he

debts.

law

contemplates

a

fair

and

equitable, not an equal, division of the marital debts1
[g]iven

the

relative

earning

capacities

and

current

state of

employment of the Bakers, the trial court properly placed
burden of the marital debt on Mr. Baker

. . . ."

the

Id. at 543

(citing Sinclair v. Sinclair, 718 P.2d 396, 398 (Utah 1986)).
Here, the court awarded Mr. Penrose an asset with which to
repay his family debts without doing the same for Ms. Penrose.
Court

failed,

differing

however,

earning

to

capacities

consider
and

or

address

employment

The

parties1

the

situations.

The

court's division of debts under these circumstances is a clear
abuse of discretion.
B.

THE VALUATION OF PROPERTY IN THE DIVISION OF
ASSETS IS IMPROPER.

The trial court's valuation of the assets awarded
Penrose

is

an

abuse

of

discretion.

The

court

to Mr.

significantly

undervalued the certificate of deposit and the parties' business,
Designers Carpet Showroom, Inc., both of which were awarded to Mr.
Penrose.
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the court
awarded

Designers

Carpet

Showroom

to Mr.

Penrose.

Due

to a

contingent sales tax liability associated with the business, the
court assigned a value of $0 to the asset, despite the fact that it

19

"has significant value as evidenced
earnings."

and

present

$0 is contrary

to the

(Exhibit A, 1f 13(a)).

The valuation
evidence

by historical

presented

of

the business

at

trial

and

at

to

Utah

law.

The

parties

stipulated to Mr. Stephen Nicolatus's valuation of the business at
approximately $194,000.00.

Although it is true that the business

bears a sales tax liability to the State of Utah, the amount of
this

liability

had

not

been

conclusively

determined.

It

is

patently unjust to award Mr. Penrose an asset valued at $0 which
may actually be worth much more.

This is particularly true here,

since the court's own Finding of Fact imply that the tax liability
is not expected to destroy the value of the business.
noted

that

indebtedness

"[d]efendant
and

continue

will

have

to earn

the

ability

income

The court

to

pay

the

consistent

with

the

pattern of historical earnings and business growth."

(Exhibit A,

If 13(a)).
Furthermore, the trial court awarded Mr. Penrose the Key Bank
Certificate of Deposit valued at $69,000.00. However, for purposes
of property

distribution,

$29,000.00 to that asset.

the court

assigned

a value of only

The court then awarded Ms. Penrose

$109,000.00 from the parties' escrow account; however, the court
valued the asset at its full cash value, despite the fact that Ms.
Penrose

is required

to repay approximately
20

$100,000.00 to her

father presumably from that asset/

The net effect of the trial

court's valuation was to award Mr. Penrose a $69,000.00 asset and
a successful business capable of generating

significant

future

income, with a combined valuation of only $29,000.00 for property
distribution purposes.
only

a

$109,000.00

Ms. Penrose, on the other hand, received

asset,

from

which

she

must

repay

a

debt

totalling nearly that same amount, and a leased vehicle valued at
$12,000.00.

Without

question,

such

an

award

is

patently

unequitable and unsupportable.
III.
THE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD WAS NOT APPROPRIATELY DETERMINED
A.

THE TRIAL COURT WAS REQUIRED TO CONSIDER THE FACTORS OF
U.C.A. § 78-45-7(3).

Utah

law requires the trial court to fashion a just and

equitable child support award when the adjusted gross income of the
parents

exceeds

the

statutory

guidelines.

This

mandates

the

consideration of the factors enumerated in U.C.A. § 78-45-7(3).
Here, the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
offer no consideration of these factors.
The trial court found that the parties' adjusted gross monthly
income was

$11,032.00, and

ordered

Mr. Penrose

to make

child

At least the property distribution ordered by the Court
awarded no other asset to Ms. Penrose from which the debt could be
paid.
21

support payments of $669.00 per month.

This amount is consistent

with the amount provided in the child support guideline table for
an adjusted

gross monthly

income of $10,001.00 to $10,100.00.

U.C.A. § 78-45-7.14 (Supp.Vol. 1995).

However, the court failed to

recognize that this is the minimum amount allowable, and to enter
an award commensurate with the parties' income.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.12 provides
[i]f the combined adjusted gross income exceeds the
highest level specified in the table, an appropriate and
just child support amount shall
be ordered on a case-bycase basis, but the amount ordered may not be less than
the highest level specified in the table for the number
of children due support.
U.C.A. § 78-45-7.12 (Supp.Vol. 1995) (emphasis added).
This language, effective July 1, 1994, must be distinguished
from the previous statute, which provided only that an appropriate
and just amount may

be ordered on a case-by-case basis.

The

replacement of "may" with "shall" evidences a legislative intent to
require the court to consider the parties' true income, rather than
mechanically apply the highest level of the table.
Although there has been no Utah law interpreting the revised
statute,

the

Colorado

Court

of

Appeals

interpreted

statute in In Re Marriage of LeBlanc, 800 P.2d
1990).
awarding

a

similar

1384 (Colo.App.

The LeBlanc court found that the trial court erred by
the minimum

presumptive

amount

of

support

where

the

parties1 combined income exceeded the highest guideline level. The
22

trial court was required, but failed to consider the relevant
factors

of

Colorado

law4.

The

court

remanded

the

decision,

directing the trial court to make further findings regarding "the
standard of living and financial needs of the children . . .
Id. at 1388.
Here, section 78-45-7(3) provides a list of the factors to be
considered

in fashioning an appropriate and just child

award under section 78-45-7.12.

support

The factors include, but are not

limited to
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)

the
the
the
the
the
the
the
the

standard of living and situation of the parties;
relative wealth and income of the parties;
ability of the obligor to earn;
ability of the obligee to earn;
needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child;
ages of the parties; and
responsibilities of the obligor and the obligee for
support of others.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7(3) (Supp.Vol. 1995).
Noticeably absent from the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law in this case is any reference to these factors.

Although

consideration of the factors was not required under the previous
version of Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.125, the mandatory language of

4

C.R.S. § 14-10-115(1) (1987 Repl.Vol. 6B) .

5

In Baker v. Baker, 866 P.2d 540 (Utah Ct.App. 1993), this
Court held that these factors should be applied only when there is
sufficient evidence to rebut the guidelines. However, Baker was
decided before the revision of U.C.A. § 78-45-7.12 (Supp.Vol.
1995).
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the

revised

appropriate

statute, which
award

when

requires

income

the

exceeds

consideration of these factors compulsory.

court
the

to

fashion

guidelines,

an

makes

The trial court abused

its discretion by applying the highest guideline amount for child
support without considering any of the factors required by Utah
law.
B.

THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED IN THIS CASE REQUIRED DEPARTURE
FROM THE GUIDELINES

Assuming, arguendo, that the revision of U.C.A. § 78-45-7.12
does

not

mandate

consideration

of

the

statutory

factors,

a

departure from the guidelines was plainly justified in this case.
Utah courts, along with other states, have consistently held that
a child support award should be entered so as to allow the children
to experience the same standard of living that they would have
experienced had there been no divorce.
In Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983), the Supreme
Court of Utah upheld a child support award over the defendant's
objections, noting that the parties and their children "enjoyed a
very high standard of living during the marriage."

Id. at 1205.

The Savage court considered the ages of the children, their prior
standard of living, and the defendant's income, and held that
[w]here
capacity
here, it
a level
children

a marriage is of long duration and the earning
of one spouse greatly exceeds that of the other, as
is appropriate to order alimony and child
support
at
which will insure that the supported spouse and
may maintain a standard of living not unduly
24

disproportionate to that which they would have enjoyed had the
marriage continued.
Id, at 1205 (emphasis added).
Here, considerable evidence was presented at trial regarding
the parties1 standard of living during their marriage, a lifestyle
that included considerable travel, recreational opportunities, and
private education for their son.

Should the parties have remained

married, in all probability their son would have continued to enjoy
these opportunities.

However, it is highly unlikely, and very

difficult to imagine how Miles may continue such a lifestyle on a
child support award of $669.00 per month.

The trial court erred by

entering a child support award which is inadequate to allow the
parties' minor son to experience the same standard of living that
he would have experienced had there been no divorce.
IV.
THE COURT'S ORDER REGARDING ATTORNEY FEES DOES NOT ADDRESS THE
CONSIDERATIONS REQUIRED BY UTAH LAW
The trial court ordered the parties to bear their own attorney
fees.

This order does not conform to the requirements of Utah law,

which compels consideration of the parties' need and ability to pay
for attorney fees.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 allows a court in a divorce action to
order a party to pay the attorney fees of the other party.

In Bell

v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489 (Utah Ct.App. 1991), this Court listed the
25

factors

to

be

considered

attorney fee award.

in

determining

the

propriety

of

an

"The award must be based on evidence of the

financial need of the receiving spouse, the ability of the other
spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested fees."

Id.

at 493.
In determining reasonableness of the requested fees, a court
may consider "the difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of
the attorneys, the reasonableness of the number of hours spent on
the case, the fee customarily charged in the locality, the amount
involved in the case and the result attained, and the expertise and
Id.,

experience of the attorneys involved."
Noticeably

absent

at 493-94.

from the trial court's decision

present case is any consideration of the Bell factors.

in the

The court

merely stated that "plaintiff has sufficient monetary assets based
on the property division" to pay her attorney fees.

(Exhibit A, if

15).

other

The

court

did

not

address

Ms.

Penrose's

debts,

including debts to her father which total $75,338.61 exclusive of
legal fees advanced by Mr. Hansen, her lack of employment, or the
fact that Mr. Penrose has a significant monthly income and limited
expenses, which would enable him to bear the cost of Ms. Penrose's
fees without substantial difficulty.
Nor did the court mention the reasonableness of the fees
requested,

despite

the

fact

that
26

considerable

evidence

was

presented

at trial on this issue.

The Bell court remanded a

similar holding, noting "the court's failure to address Wife's need
or Husband's ability to pay h€>r attorney fees leaves us with no
adequate explanation for the court's award."

Ld. at 494.

The

trial court abused its discretion by requiring Ms. Penrose to bear
her own attorney fees without considering the requisite factors.
[See me on the most recent case and how to deal with it.]
CONCLUSION
The trial court abused its discretion in setting an award of
alimony which fails to realize the goals of alimony under Utah law.
The award fails for two reasons.

It fails to allow Ms. Penrose to

maintain

living

the

same

standard

of

she

enjoyed

during

her

marriage, and it fails to equalize the parties' disposable income.
The

trial

inequitable.

court's

division

of

debts

and

property

is

The court required both parties to repay debts to

family members, but granted only Mr. Penrose an asset with which to
do so.

The valuation of the property awarded is erroneous; the

Certificate of Deposit awarded Mr. Penrose was valued at only
$29,000.00, despite its face value of $69,000.00, and the parties'
business was valued at $0, despite its history of steady growth and
increasing

income and

a finding

conclusion.
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of the Court

to support

that

The

child

support

award

is

inadequate

in

light

of

Mr.

Penrose's established monthly income of $8,932.00 per month, and
the parties' combined income of $11,032.00 per month, which exceeds
the statutory guidelines.
Finally, the court erred in requiring the parties to bear
their own attorney fees without considering the factors required by
Utah law; specifically, Ms. Penrose's need, Mr. Penrose's ability
to pay, or the reasonableness of the fees.
Ms. Penrose requests an award of attorneys fees and costs
incurred in this appeal.
DATED this

June, 1996.
CAMPBELLMAACK & SESSIONS

CLARK W. SESSIONS
DEAN C. ANDREASEN
KRISTINE EDDE
Attorneys for Appellant
Karen Penrose
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

KAREN PENROSE,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
JEFFREY HALES,
Case No. 93490224DA

Defendant/Appellee.

ADDENDUM TO BRIEF OF APPELLANT

EXHIBIT A

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

EXHIBIT B

DECREE OF DIVORCE

EXHIBIT C

UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.12
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.14
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7(3)

EXHIBIT D

ORDER OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS, DATED
APRIL 4, 1996
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Tab A

OCT t 8 fags
$UT LAM COUNTY

ELLEN MAYCOCK - 2131
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK, L.L.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2034
Telephone: (801)531-7090

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KAREN PENROSE,
Plaintiff,

]
])

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
JEFFREY PENROSE,
Defendant.

])
]1

Civil No. 93 490 2224
Judge Sandra N. Peuler
Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett, Jr.

The above-entitled matter came before the court for trial on June 14, 15, and 22, 1995.
Plaintiff was present and represented by her counsel, Clark W. Sessions, and defendant was
present and represented by his counsel, Ellen Maycock. The Honorable Sandra N. Peuler
presided. At the time of trial, the parties recited their stipulation concerning custody and
visitation. The court then heard evidence concerning the granting of the divorce, the amount and
duration of alimony, income of the parties to be used for purposes of calculating child support
and alimony, property division, and attorneys' fees. The court heard the testimony of witnesses,
received exhibits, and heard arguments of counsel. The court thereafter made a minute entry

dated August 9, 1995. Based on the foregoing, and good cause appearing, the court now makes
and enters the following:
Findings of Fact
1.

Residence. Plaintiff and defendant were bonafideresidents of Salt Lake County,

Utah, for more than three months prior to thefilingof this action.
2.

Marriage. Plaintiff and defendant are wife and husband, having been married on

August 24, 1982, in Salt Lake County, Utah.
3.

Grounds for Divorce. During the marriage, the parties had arguments that

resulted in their separation and ultimately resulted in irreconcilable differences that made the
continuation of the marriage impossible. A decree of divorce should be granted to both parties.
The decree should be final on entry.
4.

Custody and Visitation. The parties have stipulated and the court finds that it is

appropriate for the parties to be awarded joint legal custody of their minor child, Miles Penrose,
with primary physical custody to be awarded to plaintiff. Defendant should be entitled to visit
with the minor child on every other weekend, every Tuesday overnight, and on alternating
Thursdays overnight.
Holiday visitation should be exercised pursuant to the Utah Uniform Visitation Schedule
as set forth at UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-35. Holidays should take precedence over weekend
visitation, and changes should not be made to the regular rotation of the alternating weekend
visitation schedule. If a holiday visit by defendant falls on a regularly scheduled school day,
defendant should be responsible for the child's attendance at school for that school day. If a
holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday or Monday, and the total holiday period extends
beyond that time so that the child is free from school when the parent is free from work,

defendant should be entitled to the lengthier holiday period. Holidays should be exercised as
follows:
(a)

In years ending in an odd number, defendant should be entitled to the

following holidays:
(1)

Miles' birthday on the day before or after the actual birth date

beginning at 3:00 p.m. until 8:00 p.m.;
(2)

Human Rights Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the

holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday;
(3)

Easter holiday beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Friday before the holiday

until Sunday at 7:00 p.m., unless the holiday extends for a longer period of time to
which defendant should be completely entitled;
(4)

Memorial Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. Friday until Monday at 7:00

p.m., unless the holiday extends for a longer period of time to which defendant
should be completely entitled;
(5)

July 24th holiday beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the holiday

until 11:00 p.m. on the holiday;
(6)

Veterans Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the holiday

until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday; and
(7)

The first portion of the Christmas school vacation. "Christmas

School Vacation" is defined as beginning on the evening the child gets out of
school for the Christmas school break until the evening before the child returns to
school, except for Christmas Eve, Christmas Day, and New Year's Day. This
visitation should include Christmas Eve and Christmas Day until 1:00 p.m., and
Christmas School Vacation should be equally divided.

(b)

In years ending in an even number, defendant should be entitled to the

following holidays:
(1)

The child's birthday on his actual birth date beginning at 3:00 p.m.

until 9:00 p.m.;
(2)

New Year's Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the holiday

until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday;
(3)

Presidents' Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the holiday

until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday;
(4)

July 4th holiday beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the holiday

until 11:00 p.m. on the holiday;
(5)

Labor Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7:00

p.m., unless the holiday extends for a longer period of time to which defendant
should be completely entitled;
(6)

Fall school break, if applicable, commonly known as UEA

weekend, beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Wednesday until Sunday at 7:00 p.m., unless
the holiday extends for a longer period of time to which defendant should be
completely entitled;
(7)

Columbus Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the holiday

until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday;
(8)

Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday before the holiday at

7:00 p.m. until Sunday at 7:00 p.m.; and
(9)

The second portion of the Christmas School Vacation, as defined

above, plus Christmas Day beginning at 1:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m., again so long
as the entire Christmas School Vacation is equally divided between the parties.

(c)

Father's Day should be spent with defendant every year beginning at 9:00

a.m. until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday;
(d)

Mother's Day should be spent with plaintiff every year beginning at 9:00

a.m. until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday;
(e)

Each of the parties should have the right to have Miles on their own

birthdays from 3:00 p.m. until 8:00 p.m.
Defendant should be awarded four weeks of visitation during the summer or one-half of
"off track" periods if the minor child is in year round school. Each party should be entitled to at
least two weeks of uninterrupted time with Miles for the purpose of vacations and other
activities. Each party should give at least thirty days notice of his or her intent to exercise this
uninterrupted time with Miles. The uninterrupted vacation time may occur at any time during
the year, so long as it does not interfere with Miles' school schedule.
Defendant should have reasonable telephone visitation.
Further, the parties have stipulated and the court finds that it is appropriate that neither
party should have the child in his or her presence overnight in their residence in the presence of a
guest of the opposite sex to whom they are not married or related.
The pick up and return of the minor child for visitation should be curbside. Neither party
should enter the residence of the other party.
Defendant should provide to plaintiff has much notice as possible of any time when he
will not exercise visitation at a scheduled time. In the event that plaintiff travels out of town, she
should offer defendant the opportunity to care for the parties' child before obtaining surrogate
care.
All clothing and personal effects of the minor child provided by plaintiff for visitation
periods should be returned by defendant at the end of the visitation period.

If visitation is exercised overnight, defendant shall prepare the minor child for school the
next morning or notify plaintiff whether he will deliver the child to school.
5.

Incomes of the Parties. Plaintiff is 34 years old and a high school graduate. She

had one year of post high school study in Art and History. She has no other formal training or
education. Prior to her marriage, plaintiff worked as a secretary in her father's business for a
brief period of time and operated her own business, a balloon greeting business. Plaintiff has
skills developed during her involvement with the parties' businesses throughout the marriage,
including hiring and training personnel, payroll, sales, and purchasing.

Plaintiff worked

extensively in the parties' business which they established and operated in Hawaii immediately
following their marriage. She was also employed at Designers Carpet Showroom, the parties'
current business. Due to her pregnancy and the birth of her child, she has only worked
periodically at that business. She has not been employed in any wayfromthe time of the parties'
separation in May of 1993, to the time of trial.
Plaintiffs health is good. Although she had a surgical procedure planned, the same
surgery was recommended to her six years ago following the birth of her child and she elected
not to have surgery at that time. There is no evidence that there was any condition relating to
plaintiffs health that would interfere with her ability to obtain employment. The parties' child
Miles will begin kindergarten this fall and will be out of the home for one-half day during the
school year.
Connie Romboy, a vocational evaluator, testified. That testimony indicated that with
plaintiffs skills, she could obtain employment with an hourly wage ranging from approximately
$4.50 to $7.40 per hour. Based on plaintiffs experience in business management, Ms. Romboy
testified that plaintiff should expect a wage in the higher portion of that range.

Based on the foregoing, plaintiffs health, her age, her abilities and skills, the court finds
that plaintiff is able to work on a full time basis at approximately $7.00 per hour ($1,200 gross
per month). If plaintiff were fully employed, she could contribute approximately $900 net per
month to her own living expenses and needs. Further, prior to her marriage, plaintiff received
stock from her family during the marriage and continuing to the present. Plaintiff has received
regular incomefromthat stock on a monthly basis. Although the amount has fluctuated, plaintiff
presently receives about $900 per month.
During the parties' marriage, they had a lavish lifestyle. They traveled both in and out of
the United States, were able to give one another expensive gifts of jewelry, clothing, and furs,
and they owned luxury cars and expensive homes. Much of the parties' lifestyle was financed by
plaintiffs parents, who gave the parties money, paid for trips, and provided all their financial
living requirements for almost four years during their marriage. At the time the parties married,
neither party was employed. They traveled to Hawaii in October 1992, where they lived in a
beach front condominium owned by plaintiffs parents for approximately three and one-half
years. During this period, they paid no rent or mortgage payments, no utilities, no taxes, and no
insurance. Plaintiffs parents paid all of those expenses. Plaintiffs parents also furnished a
vehicle to the parties, which was maintained and for which gas and oil was provided at no cost to
the parties. The parties were able to concentrate all of their energy and resources on developing a
jet ski rental business in Hawaii. During the first part of their marriage, based on the plaintiffs
parents financing their living expenses, the parties were able to build a financially successful
business, ultimately selling the business at a profit and able to save a large sum of money.
When the parties returned to Utah, both the proceeds from the sale of their business and
money saved from the profits of the business were used to purchase the first of the parties'
homes and luxury cars. During the continuation of the marriage, plaintiffs parents continued to

provide gifts and other financial assistance to the parties that allowed them to maintain a lifestyle
beyond what they could have afforded by their own efforts.

The parties' lifestyle greatly

exceeded the income actually derived from their businesses. Both parties also testified that, in
recent years, in their marriage, they had spent everything they earned and had not set anything
aside as savings.
Defendant's income, including salary and benefits from the parties' business, from 1991
through 1994, averaged approximately $126,000 per year based on the expert testimony of Steve
Nicolatus. During those years, the parties expended the average sum of $126,000 on themselves.
However, during that same time period, 1991 through 1993, the parties had failed to properly pay
sales tax from their business profits to the extent of approximately $46,000 per year. If that
amount had been appropriately deducted, the parties' income from their business, Designers
Carpet Showroom, would have averaged closer to $80,000 per year. It is clear that the parties
spent more money than that on themselves; however, it is appropriate to deduct the legally
required sales tax in order to arrive at a true picture of the business income for those years. In
1994, defendant's income from Designers Carpet Showroom from salary and benefits was
$107,188, based on the testimony of the parties' expert, Steve Nicolatus. Sales tax for 1994 was
properly deducted and paid by the business. Payment of worker's compensation premiums may
affect defendant's income in the future. However, at the time of trial, defendant had not been
required to make those payments and the amount required was disputed. Therefore, the court has
not offset any amount for worker's compensation.
Since 1990, Designers Carpet Showroom has experienced consistent growth. Gross sales
have increased approximately 19% per year through 1994. Given the income the parties were
legally entitled to receive through 1993, after offsets for sales tax, and given that growth, the
1994 income is not inconsistent with historical income. Based on that evidence, the court finds

that the appropriate nitoint 101 purposes of calailatifijj ilnld support and jliiiiuJiy is defendant's
1994 income of $ 107,188, or an average of $8,932 per month.
6.

Child Support. Based on plaintiffs gross monthly income from stock dividends

and her ability to ea i n an ad iitional $1,2:00 per month gross income, her income for purposes of
calculating child support is $2,100 per month. Based on defendant's income of $8,932 per
month, defendant should pay base child support to plaintiff for the benefit of the parties' minor
child in the sum of $669 per month. Child support should be paid one-half on the fifth day and
one-half on the twentieth day of each month, effective upon entry of the decree of divorce. Child
support should continue inilil I he parties' child reaches the a)j,e of eighteen or graduates from
high school in the normal course, whichever last occurs.
7.

Child Care Expenses. Defendant should be ordered to pay one-half of any future

work-related or career training eh ild cai e expenses actually incurred by plaintiff
8.

Income Withholding. It is not necessary for the court to implement immediate

withholding of child support pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-11-501 based oi I defendant's
voluntary and timely payment of child support. However, if defendant falls thirty or more days
in arrears in his child support obligation, plaintiff should be entitled to immediate mandatory
income withholding relief pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-1 I 10!
9.

Alimony. The court's findings as to plaintiffs and defendant's incomes are set

forth in paragraph 5 above. As to plaintiffs expenses, plaintiffs reasonable living expenses are
approximatch $ ^KIM) per mnnlli. Huth parties claimed excessive expenses which their incomes
will not support. In part, this is based on the lifestyle they enjoyed during their marriage, which
was financed not only by the parties' own income from their businesses, but sininj.'s accrued
from their Ilawaiian business, and by plaintiffs parents who assisted with the parties' ability to
enjoy an extravagant lifestyle. As to plaintiffs stated monthly expenses, she presently pays no

real property taxes or insurance on the residence in which she resides. She is renting that home
from her father and she testified that she pays rent when she is able to do so. Defendant further
testified and the court finds credible that plaintiffs father pays for the maintenance on the home.
Plaintiff currently p.ns nu medical 01 denial insurance pn-nuuin », and the court hulliei finds that
her telephone expense and other expenses, such as entertainment, grooming, installment
payments, and income taxes, are excessive.

should be ordered to pay alimony to plaintiff in the sum of $1,331 per month, to commence upon
entry of the decree of divorce. Alimony should be paid one-half on the fifth day and one-half on
the twentieth day of each month. Further, based on the duration of the parties' marriage, the
length of time that plaintiff has been out of the job market, and the parties' disparate abilities to

marriage consistent with UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5. Alimony should terminate upon plaintiffs
remarriage, cohabitation, or death, or upon further order of the court, or at the expiration of
thirteen years from the date of the trial herein, June 15, 1995, whichever first occurs.
10.

Restraining Order. Both parties should be permanently enjoined from harassing,

annoying, or threatening the other, and from making any derogatory remarks about the other in
the presence of their minor child.
11.

Health Insurance. Defendant should be ordered to maintain health and medical

insurance for the benefit of the parties' minor child w itli a deductible a moi ml: no greater than
$500

In the event that defendant wishes to maintain health and medical insurance for the child

with a deductible greater than $500, he should be solely responsible for the payment of any
additional deduct il >k costs incurred

Consistent w itli I J I AI I CODE ANN. § 78-45-7 15, each party

should pay one-half of the out-of-pocket cost of the premium actually paid for the child's portion

III! ihr health insuunu'

I irli pam should In1 nntnvd in |ia\ one-hall ril all tcdsuiubl) and

necessary uninsured medical expenses, including copayments and deductibles, incurred for the
parties' minor child.
12.

Preschool Tuition. The parties agreed at the time of their separation to share

equally the cost of minor child's private preschool tuition. Defendant has not paid his entire
share and should pay the amount of $564 to plaintiff, represeiitiiig the balance < if his share of
those costs.

13

Property Division:
(a)

Designers Carpet Showroom.

During the pai ties' man iage, they

purchased and operated a business known as Designers Carpet Showroom. Based on the
testimony of the expert witness jointly engaged by the parties, Steve Nicolatus, the fair
market value ol that business is $194,000, Oie I Jtah State Tax Commission has assessed
$213,000 against the business based on the parties' failure to remit sales taxes for the
years 1991 through 1993. Defendant testified th;i1 lie expects to i»e able to irdua 1 tiuf
amount by approximately $30,000 through negotiation or through providing evidence to
the Tax Commission that certain designers have paid sales tax on the transactions at
issue In addition, there has been, assessed against the hi i siness a 1 \ orker's compensation
premium payment, the amount of which is presently in dispute. Based on the foregoing,
the court finds that the value of the business is approximately $194,000, and the debts
ow eel b> the bi isiness are approximately the same amount. The court awards Designers
Carpet Showroom to defendant.

Thus, although the business is valued at zero for

purposes of distributing the parties' property, the coi irt finds that it has significant \ alue
as evidenced by historical and present earnings. Defendant will have the ability to pay

the indebtedness and continue to earn income consistent with the pattern of historical
earnings and business growth.
(b)

Utah Water Sports. Defendant testified that he obtained a 40% interest in

the business based on his initial investment in the sum of $12,000. The $12,000 was
marital funds generated from the business owned by the parties. Because the court is not
able to determine the present value of the 40% interest, the court concludes that the
interest in Utah Water Sports should be divided between the parties equally.
(c)

Key Bank Certificate of Deposit. The parties own a Key Bank certificate

of deposit with a current value of approximately $69,000. Defendant pledged that
certificate of deposit to secure the Utah Water Sports line of credit to allow Utah Water
Sports to purchase inventory. Forty thousand dollars of that amount was borrowed from
defendant's grandmother and should be returned to defendant so that he can repay that
loan. The balance, approximately $29,000, is awarded to defendant.
(d)

Furniture and Furnishings. The parties divided their furniture at the time

they separated. Plaintiff has valued items she took at $18,000, while defendant values the
same items at $25,000. Defendant retained a portion of the furniture and furnishings,
although he testified their value was minimal. On the other hand, plaintiff testified that
defendant's furniture had a value of approximately $34,000. Based on the parties'
testimony and a review of the list of items provided in defendant's exhibits, the court
concludes that each party received approximately $25,000 in value in furniture and
furnishings and those items should be retained by the party who presently has them.
Further, both parties received gifts of jewelry from the other, and each party should be
awarded those items.

(e)

Vehicles. Defendant has in his possession a Bronco with a value of

approximately $8,000, two snowmobiles valued at $13,000, a trailer for the snowmobiles
valued at $2,000. Those items should be awarded to him. Plaintiff has a BMW which
she currently leases which should be awarded to her. At the time the parties separated,
plaintiff had a Mercedes Benz, which she sold or traded in on the BMW. Although
plaintiff testified that the BMW has no value to her because she cannot purchase the car
at the end of the lease, the court finds that it has a value of approximately $12,000, since
a marital asset valued at approximately $12,000 was used to allow her to obtain the
BMW.
(f)

Bank Accounts. Each party should be awarded his or her respective

checking account. The furniture account which the parties had prior to their separation
was used by both parties through May of 1993. At that time, the amount in this account
was between $4,500 and $6,000. The parties separated in approximately February of
1993 and a temporary order for child support and alimony was not entered until
September of that year. Plaintiff testified that she used the balance of the funds in the
furniture account to provide support for herself and the parties' child. The court finds
that that use is reasonable and declines to set any value on the account for purposes of
property distribution.
(g)

Escrowed Funds. The parties have funds in escrow obtained from the sale

of their marital residence, which sale occurred after their separation. The current balance
in the account is approximately $178,000. In order to equalize the property distribution,
the court finds that plaintiff should be awarded from the escrow account the sum of
$109,000, and defendant should be awarded the sum of $69,000. If the amount of the

escrow funds is in excess of $178,000, the excess should be equally divided between the
parties.
14.

Debts and Obligations.

Defendant should assume and pay all debts and

obligations owed in connection with Designers Carpet Showroom. In addition, defendant should
repay the $40,000 borrowedfromhis grandmother. Each party should assume and pay any credit
card debt or loan incurred by him or her during their separation. Plaintiff should be ordered to
assume and pay all debts owed to her father, which includes in substantial part, the attorneys'
fees she has incurred in connection with this action.
15.

Attorneys' Fees and Costs. The court finds that plaintiff has sufficient monetary

assets based on the property division to pay the debt for her attorneys' fees. She should be
ordered to pay that amount, except the amount defendant was previously ordered to pay by
temporary order in this matter.
16.

Life Insurance. The court finds that defendant has a life insurance policy with a

face amount between $300,000 and $350,000. Based on his agreement, the court finds that it is
reasonable for defendant to name plaintiff and the parties' minor child as beneficiaries of the
policy for the time periods during which he is obligated to pay child support and alimony.
17.

Motion To Seal File. Plaintiffs motion to seal the file should be granted.

18.

Tra Provisions:
(a)

Defendant should be awarded the right to claim the minor child of the

parties as an exemption for federal and state income tax purposes. In the event that
plaintiff obtains employment and child support is adjusted, the court shall reconsider the
award of this tax exemption.

(b)

In the event any joint income tax return of the parties is audited or

amended, defendant should be solely liable for the payment of any additional tax, penalty,
or interest assessed, or should be awarded any refund.
From the foregoingfindingsof fact, the court now makes and enters the following:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The court has jurisdiction over the parties of this action and the subject matter of

this action.
2.

Each party is entitled to a decree of divorce from the other party on grounds of

irreconcilable differences.
3.

The decree of divorce should conform to the foregoing findings of fact.

DATED this / & day of October, 1995.
BY THE COURT:

QOf^^0*-^^
JUDGE SANDRA N. PEULER
Approved as to form:
A

''UaoAY)
CLARK W. SESSIONS
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the following, postage prepaid, this \~b day of
October, 1995:
Clark W. Sessions, Esq.
Campbell, Maack & Sessions
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2215
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KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK, L.L.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2034
Telephone: (801)531-7090

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KAREN PENROSE,
Plaintiff,

]
])

VS.

j

JEFFREY PENROSE,

]>

Defendant.

)1

DECREE OF DIVORCE

Civil No. 93 490 2224
Judge Sandra N. Peuler
Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett, Jr.

The above-entitled matter came before the court for trial on June 14, 15, and 22, 1995.
Plaintiff was present and represented by her counsel, Clark W. Sessions, and defendant was
present and represented by his counsel, Ellen Maycock. The Honorable Sandra N. Peuler
presided. At the time of trial, the parties recited their stipulation concerning custody and
visitation. The court then heard evidence concerning the granting of the divorce, the amount and
duration of alimony, income of the parties to be used for purposes of calculating child support
and alimony, property division, and attorneys' fees. The court heard the testimony of witnesses,
received exhibits, and heard arguments of counsel. The court thereafter made a minute entry

dated August 9, 1995. Based on the foregoing, and the court having made and entered its
findings of fact and conclusions of law,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IF IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED as follows:
1.

Decree of Divorce. Each party is granted a decree of divorce from the other party

on grounds of irreconcilable differences and decree will befinalupon signing and entry.
2.

Custody and Visitation. Plaintiff and defendant are awarded joint legal custody of

their minor child, Miles Penrose, with primary physical custody to be awarded to plaintiff.
Defendant is entitled to visitation with the minor child on every other weekend, every Tuesday
overnight, and on alternating Thursdays overnight.
Holiday visitation shall be exercised pursuant to the Utah Uniform Visitation Schedule as
set forth at UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-35. Holidays shall take precedence over weekend
visitation, and changes shall not be made to the regular rotation of the alternating weekend
visitation schedule. If a holiday visit by defendant falls on a regularly scheduled school day,
defendant shall be responsible for the child's attendance at school for that school day. If a
holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday or Monday, and the total holiday period extends
beyond that time so that the child is free from school when the parent is free from work,
defendant is entitled to the lengthier holiday period. Holidays shall be exercised as follows:
(a)

In years ending in an odd number, defendant is entitled to the following

holidays:
(1)

Miles' birthday on the day before or after the actual birth date

beginning at 3:00 p.m. until 8:00 p.m.;
(2)

Human Rights Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the

holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday;

(3)

Easter holiday beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Friday before the holiday

until Sunday at 7:00 p.m., unless the holiday extends for a longer period of time to
which defendant is completely entitled;
(4)

Memorial Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. Friday until Monday at 7:00

p.m., unless the holiday extends for a longer period of time to which defendant is
completely entitled;
(5)

July 24th holiday beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the holiday

until 11:00 p.m. on the holiday;
(6)

Veterans Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the holiday

until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday; and
(7)

The first portion of the Christmas school vacation. "Christmas

School Vacation" is defined as beginning on the evening the child gets out of
school for the Christmas school break until the evening before the child returns to
school, except for Christmas Eve, Christmas Day, and New Year's Day. This
visitation should include Christmas Eve and Christmas Day until 1:00 p.m., and
Christmas School Vacation shall be equally divided.
(b)

In years ending in an even number, defendant is entitled to the following

holidays:
(1)

The child's birthday on his actual birth date beginning at 3:00 p.m.

until 9:00 p.m.;
(2)

New Year's Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the holiday

until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday;
(3)

Presidents' Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the holiday

until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday;

(4)

July 4th holiday beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the holiday

until 11:00 p.m. on the holiday;
(5)

Labor Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7:00

p.m., unless the holiday extends for a longer period of time to which defendant is
completely entitled;
(6)

Fall school break, if applicable, commonly known as UEA

weekend, beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Wednesday until Sunday at 7:00 p.m., unless
the holiday extends for a longer period of time to which defendant is completely
entitled;
(7)

Columbus Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the holiday

until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday;
(8)

Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday before the holiday at

7:00 p.m. until Sunday at 7:00 p.m.; and
(9)

The second portion of the Christmas School Vacation, as defined

above, plus Christmas Day beginning at 1:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m., again so long
as the entire Christmas School Vacation is equally divided between the parties.
(c)

Father's Day shall be spent with defendant every year beginning at 9:00

a.m. until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday;
(d)

Mother's Day shall be spent with plaintiff every year beginning at 9:00

a.m. until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday;
(e)

Each party shall have the right to have Miles on his or her own birthday

from 3:00 p.m. until 8:00 p.m.
Defendant is awarded four weeks of visitation during the summer or one-half of "off
track" periods if the minor child is in year round school. Each party is entitled to at least two

weeks of uninterrupted time with Miles for the purpose of vacations and other activities. Each
party shall give at least thirty days notice of his or her intent to exercise this uninterrupted time
with Miles. The uninterrupted vacation time may occur at any time during the year, so long as it
does not interfere with Miles' school schedule.
Defendant is awarded reasonable telephone visitation.
Neither party should have the child in his or her presence overnight in their residence in
the presence of a guest of the opposite sex to whom they are not married or related.
The pick up and return of the minor child for visitation shall be curbside. Neither party
shall enter the residence of the other party.
Defendant is ordered to provide to plaintiff as much notice as possible of any time when
he will not exercise visitation at a scheduled time. In the event plaintiff travels our of town, she
is ordered to offer defendant the opportunity to care for the parties' child before obtaining
surrogate care.
Defendant is ordered to return all clothing and personal effects of the minor child
provided by plaintiff for visitation at the end of the visitation period.
If visitation is exercised overnight, defendant shall prepare the minor child for school the
next morning and notify plaintiff whether he will deliver the child to school.
3.

Child Support. Defendant is ordered to pay child support to plaintiff for the

benefit of the parties' minor child in the sum of $669 per month. Child support shall be paid
one-half on the fifth day and one-half on the twentieth day of each month, effective upon entry of
the decree of divorce. Child support shall continue until the parties' child reaches the age of
eighteen or graduatesfromhigh school in the normal course, whichever last occurs.
4.

Child Care Expenses. Defendant is ordered to pay one-half of any future work-

related or career training child care expenses actually incurred by plaintiff.

5.

Income Withholding. It is not necessary for the court to implement immediate

withholding of child support pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-11-501 based on defendant's
voluntary and timely payment of child support. However, if defendant falls thirty or more days
in arrears in his child support obligation, plaintiff is entitled to immediate mandatory income
withholding relief pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-11-401.
6.

Alimony. Defendant is ordered to pay to plaintiff alimony in the sum of $1,331

per month, to commence upon entry of the decree of divorce. Alimony shall be paid one-half on
the fifth day and one-half on the twentieth day of each month. The duration of alimony should
be permanent, but not to exceed the length of the marriage consistent with UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 30-3-5. Alimony shall terminate upon plaintiffs remarriage, cohabitation, or death, or upon
further order of the court, or at the expiration of thirteen years from the date of the trial herein,
June 15, 1995, whicheverfirstoccurs.
7.

Restraining Order.

Both parties are permanently enjoined from harassing,

annoying, or threatening the other, and from making any derogatory remarks about the other in
the presence of their minor child.
8.

Health Insurance. Defendant is ordered to maintain health and medical insurance

for the benefit of the parties' minor child with a deductible amount no greater than $500. In the
event that defendant wishes to maintain health and medical insurance for the child with a
deductible greater than $500, defendant shall be solely responsible for payment of any additional
deductible costs incurred. Consistent with UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.15, each party is ordered
to pay one-half of the out-of-pocket cost of the premium actually paid for the child's portion of
the health insurance. Each party is ordered to pay one-half of all reasonably and necessary
uninsured medical expenses, including copayments and deductibles, incurred for the parties'
minor child.

9.

Preschool Tuition. Defendant is ordered to pay the amount of $564 to plaintiff,

representing the balance of his share of the preschool tuition costs.

10.

Property Division:
(a)

Designers Carpet Showroom.

Defendant is awarded the business

Designers Carpet Showroom,freeand clear of any claim of plaintiff.
(b)

Utah Water Sports. The interest in Utah Water Sports is awarded to the

parties equally.
(c)

Key Bank Certificate of Deposit. The Key Bank certificate of deposit

valued at approximately $69,000 is awarded to defendant, free and clear of any claim of
plaintiff.
(d)

Furniture and Furnishings.

Each party is awarded the furniture,

furnishings, jewelry, and personal property items presently in his or her possession, free
and clear of any claim of the other party.
(e)

Vehicles. Defendant is awarded the Bronco, two snowmobiles, and a

trailer for the snowmobiles, free and clear of any claim of plaintiff. Plaintiff is awarded
the BMW which she currently leases,freeand clear of any claim of defendant.
(f)

Bank Accounts. Each party is awarded his or her respective checking

account.
(g)

Escrowed Funds. Plaintiff is awarded the sum of $109,000 from the

escrow account and defendant is awarded the sum of $69,000. If the amount of the
escrow funds is in excess of $178,000, the excess shall be equally divided between the
parties.
11.

Debts and Obligations. Defendant is ordered to assume and pay all debts and

obligations owed in connection with Designers Carpet Showroom. In addition, defendant is

ordered to repay the $40,000 borrowed from his grandmother. Each party is ordered to assume,
pay, and hold the other party harmless from any credit card debt or loan incurred by him or her
during their separation. Plaintiff is ordered to assume and pay all debts owed to her father, which
includes in substantial part, the attorneys' fees she has incurred in connection with this action.
12.

Attorneys' Fees and Costs. Each party should pay his or her own attorney's fees

and costs, except the amount defendant was previously ordered to pay by temporary order in this
matter.
13.

Life Insurance. Defendant is ordered to maintain his present policy of life

insurance with a face amount between $300,000 and $350,000, naming plaintiff and the parties'
minor child as beneficiaries of the policy for the time periods during which he is obligated to pay
child support and alimony.
14.

Motion To Seal File. Plaintiffs motion to seal the file is granted and the file

should be sealed in this matter.

15.

Tax Provisions:
(a)

Defendant is awarded the right to claim the minor child of the parties as an

exemption for federal and state income tax purposes. In the event that plaintiff obtains
employment and child support is adjusted, the court shall reconsider the award of this tax
exemption.
(b)

In the event any joint income tax return of the parties is audited or

amended, defendant shall be solely liable for the payment of any additional tax, penalty,
or interest assessed, or shall be awarded any refund.

DATED this \f) day of October, 1995.
BY THE COURT:

\Df^u<
JUDGE SANDRA N. PEULER
Approved as to form:

iZf<^i

/' J /

CLARK W. SESSIONS
Attorney for Plaintiff

4-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing DECREE OF
DIVORCE to the following, postage prepaid, this \ 3

day of October, 1995:

Clark W. Sessions, Esq.
Campbell, Maack & Sessions
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -2215
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30-3-4. Pleadings — Findings — Decree — Use of affidavit
— Sealing.
(1) (a) The complaint shall be in writing and signed by the* plaintiff or
plaintiffs attorney.
(b) A decree of divorce may not be granted upon default or otherwise
except upon legal evidence taken in the cause. If the decree is to be entered
upon the default of the defendant, evidence to support the decree may be
submitted upon the affidavit of the plaintiff with the approval of the court.
(c) If the plaintiff and the defendant have a child or children and the
plaintiff has filed an action in the judicial district as defined in Section
78-1-2.1 where the pilot program shall be administered, a decree of divorce
may not be granted until both parties have attended a mandatory course
provided in Section 30-3-11.3 and have presented a certificate of course
completion to the court. The court may waive this requirement, on its own
motion or on the motion of one of the parties, if it determines course
attendance and completion are not necessary, appropriate, feasible, or in
the best interest of the parties.
(d) All hearings and trials for divorce shall be held before the court or
the court commissioner as provided by Section 78-3-31 and rules of the
Judicial Council. The court or the commissioner in all divorce cases shall
enter the decree upon the evidence or, in the case of a decree after default
of the defendant, upon the plaintiffs affidavit.
(2) The file, except the decree of divorce, may be sealed by order of the court
upon the motion of either party. The sealed portion of the file is available to the
public only upon an order of the court. The concerned parties, the attorneys of
record or attorney filing a notice of appearance in the action, the Office of
Recovery Services if a party to the proceedings has applied for or is receiving
public assistance, or the court have full access to the entire record. This sealing
does not apply to subsequent filings to enforce or amend the decree.
History: ILS. 1898 & CJL 1907, $ 1211; L.
1909, ch. 60, § 1; CJL. 1917, § 2999; R.S. 1933
& C. 1943,40-3-4; L. 1957, ch. 55, § 1; 1961,
ch. 59, § 1; 1969, ch. 72, § 2; 1983, ch. 116,
§ 1; 1985, ch. 151, § 1; 1989, ch. 104, § 1;
1990, ch. 230, § 1; 1991, ch. 5, § 35; 1992, ch.
98, § 1; 1992, ch. 290, S 3; 1995, ch. 62, § 1.

Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendment, effective July 1, 1995, added the second
sentence of Subsection (1Kb) and in the second
sentence of Subsection (l)(d) substituted "shall
enter the decree" for "shall make and file findings and decree" and added the language beginrung "or, m the case o r at the end.

30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and
health care of parties and children — Division of
debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction —
Custody and visitation — Determination of alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it
equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and
parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children;
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order
requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital,
and dental care insurance for the dependent children;

DIVORCE

30-3-5

(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of
joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or
incurred during marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or
obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders;
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A,
Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5; and
(e) with regard to child support orders issued or modified on or after
January 1, 1994, that are subject to income withholding, an order
assessing against the obligor an additional $7 per month check processing
fee to be included in the amount withheld and paid to the OflBce of
Recovery Services within the Department of Human Services for the
purposes of income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11,
Parts 4 and 5.
The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order
fning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses
Ted on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment
aining of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circum:es are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately
I for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide
care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or
ing of the custodial parent.
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or
Drders for the custody of the children and their support, maintenance,
h, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations for
as is reasonable and necessary.
(a) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other
lembers of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best
iterest of the child.
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer
nforcement, the court may include in an order establishing a visitation
:hedule a provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer to
tiforce a court ordered visitation schedule entered under this chapter.
If a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a
order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the
lable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if
urt determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or
led against in good faith.
If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a visitation order by
nt, a grandparent, or other member of the immediate family pursuant to
u 78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been previously granted by the
the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual
ey fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the
party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation,
a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining
imony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and
(iv) the length of the marriage.
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(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining
alimony.
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living,
existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance
with Subsection (a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts
and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the
standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short
duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the
marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the
time of the marriage.
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' respective standards of living.
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a
major change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective
efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital
property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's
earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both
spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating
adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony.
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves,
and no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the
court may consider restoring each party to the condition which existed at
the time of the marriage.
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive
changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial
material change in circumstances not forseeable at the time of the
divorce.
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for
alimony to address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time
the decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action.
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse
of the payor may not be considered, except as provided in this
subsection.
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial
ability to share living expenses.
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse
if the court finds that the payor's improper conduct justifies that
consideration.
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number
of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination
of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the
payment of alimony for a longer period of time.
(8) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates
upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is
annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the
party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights
are determined.
(9) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former
spouse is cohabitating with another person.

COHABITANT ABUSE ACT
[istoiy: RJ3.1898 & CX. 1907, § 1212; L.
9, ch. 109, § 4; CX. 1917, § 3000; R.S.
3 & C. 1943, 40-3-5; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 3;
5, ch. 81, § 1; 1979, ch. 110, § 1; 1984, ch.
8 1; 1985, ch. 72, § 1; 1985, ch. 100, § 1;
I, ch. 257, § 4; 1993, ch. 152, § 1; 1993,
261, S 1; 1994, ch. 284, § 1; 1995, ch. 330,
nendment Notes. — The 1995 amendt, effective May 1,1995, deleted a provision
Subsection (3) for support and maintee orders; deleted former Subsections (5)
(6), providing that alimony terminates
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upon remarriage, or cohabitation with a member of the opposite sex, by the payee; added
Subsections (7) to (9); renumbered former Subsections (7) and (8) as (5) and (6); and made
stylistic changes.
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1995, ch. 330,
which amended this section, provides in § 2
that the Legislature does not intend that termination of alimony based on cohabitation, in
accordance with Subsection (9), "be interpreted
in any way to condone such a relationship for
any purpose."

CHAPTER 5
GRANDPARENTS
>n
I.

Visitation rights of grandparents.

>-2. Visitation rights of grandparents.
The district court may grant grandparents reasonable rights of visitaif it is in the best interest of the grandchildren, in cases where a
dparent's child has died or has become a noncustodial parent through
•ce or legal separation.
Grandparents may petition the court as provided in Section 78-32-12.2
tnedy a parent's wrongful noncompliance with a visitation order.
tory: C. 1953, 30-5-2, enacted by L.
ch. 123, § 2; 1993, ch. 152, § 2; 1995,
7,§ 1.
mdment Notes. — The 1995 amendsffective May 1,1995, deleted "and other

immediate family members9 from both subsections and in Subsection (1) substituted "grandchildren" for "children" and added the clause
beginning "in cases" to the end.

CHAPTER 6
COHABITANT ABUSE ACT
Definitions.
Abuse or danger of abuse — Protective orders.
Venue of action.
Forms for petitions and protective
orders — Assistance.
Continuing duty to inform court of
other proceedings — Effect of
other proceedings.
Protective orders — Ex parte protective orders — Modification of
orders — Duties of the court.
Hearings on ex parte orders.
No denial of relief solely because
of lapse of time.

Section
30-6-4.5.

Mutual protective orders prohibited.
30-6-4.6.
Prohibition of court-ordered or
court-referred mediation.
30-6-4.8.
Electronic monitoring of domestic
violence offenders.
30-6-5 to 30-6-7. Repealed.
30-6-8.
Statewide domestic violence network — Peace officers1 duties —
Prevention of abuse in absence
of order — Limitation of liability
30-6-9, 30-6-10. Repealed.
30-6-11.
Division of Family Services — Development and assistance of volunteer network.
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78-45-7.10. Reduction when child becomes 18.
(1) When a child becomes 18 years of age, or has graduatedfromhigh school
during the child's normal and expected year of graduation, whichever occurs
later, the base child support award is automatically reduced to reflect the lower
base combined child support obligation shown in the table for the remaining
number of children due child support, unless otherwise provided in the child
support order.
(2) The award may not be reduced by a per child amount derived from the
base child support award originally ordered.
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.10, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 12; 1994, ch. 118, § 11.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective July 1, 1994, inserted "or has

graduated from high school during the child's
normal and expected year of graduation, whichever occurs later" and deleted "combined" before "child support award" in Subsection (1).

78*45-7.11. Reduction for extended visitation.
(1) The child support order shall provide that the base child support award
be reduced by 50% for each child for time periods during which the child is with
the noncustodial parent by order of the court or by written agreement of the
parties for at least 25 of any 30 consecutive days. If the dependent child is a
recipient of Aid to Families with Dependent Children, any agreement by the
parties for reduction of child support during extended visitation shall be
approved by the administrative agency. However, normal visitation and
holiday visits to the custodial parent shall not be considered an interruption of
the consecutive day requirement.
(2) For purposes of this section the per child amount to which the abatement
applies shall be calculated by dividing the base child support award by the
number of children included in the award.
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.11, enacted by L. of any 30 consecutive days" at the end of the
1989, ch. 214, § 13; 1990, ch. 100, § 9; 1994, first sentence and substituted the second and
ch. 118, § 12.
third sentences for "Only the base child support
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- award is affected by the 50% abatement. The
ment, effective July 1, 1994, in Subsection (1), amount to be paid for work related child care
substituted the language beginning "which the costs may be suspended if the costs are not
child is" for "which the order grants specific incurred during the extended visitation."
extended visitation for that child for at least 25

78-45-7.12. Income in excess of tables.
If the combined adjusted gross income exceeds the highest level specified in
the table, an appropriate and just child support amount shall be ordered on a
case-by-case basis, but the amount ordered may not be less than the highest
level specified in the table for the number of children due support.
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.12, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 14; 1994, ch. 118, § 13.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-

ment, effective July 1,1994, substituted "shall"
for "may" and inserted "on a case-by-case basis."
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78-45-7.14

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Baker v Baker, 866 R2d 540 (Utah
CtApp 1993)

78-45-7.13. Advisory committee — Membership and functions.
(1) On or before March 1, 1995, and every fourth year subsequently, the
governor shall appoint an advisory committee consisting of:
(a) two representatives recommended by the Office of Recovery Services;
(b) two representatives recommended by the Judicial Council;
(c) two representatives recommended by the Utah State Bar Association; and
(d) an uneven number of additional persons, not to exceed five, who
represent diverse interests related to child support issues, as the governor
may consider appropriate. However, none of the individuals appointed
under this subsection may be members of the Utah State Bar Association.
(2) (a) The advisory committee shall review the child support guidelines to
ensure their application results in the determination of appropriate child
support award amounts.
(b) The committee shall report to the Legislative Judiciary Interim
Committee on or before October 1 in 1989 and 1991, and then on or before
October 1 of every fourth year subsequently.
(c) The committee's report shall include recommendations of the majority of the committee, as well as specific recommendations of individual
members of the committee.
(3) The committee members serve without compensation. Staff for the
>mmittee shall be provided from the existing budgets of the Department of
uman Services and the Judicial Council. The committee ceases to exist no
ter than the date the subsequent committee under this section is appointed.
history: C. 1953,78-45-7.13, enacted by L.
39, ch. 214, § 15; 1990, ch. 183, § 58; 1994,
118, § 14.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendnt, effective July 1, 1994, substituted

"March 1, 1995" for "May 1, 1989 and May 1,
1991" and deleted "then on or before May 1 o f
before "every fourth year" in the introductory
language of Subsection (1).

-45-7.14. Base combined child support obligation table
and low income table.
Tie following includes the Base Combined Child Support Obligation Table
i the Low Income Table:
BASE COMBINED CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION TABLE
(Both Parents)
tthly Combined
Gross Income
rom

1

2

99

184

Number of Children
3
4

5

6

200

201

To

650 — 675

191

198

214
Monthly Combined
Adj. Gross Income

1,001
1,051
1,101
1,151
1,201
1,251
1,301
1,351
1,401
1,451
1,501
1,551
1,601
1,651
1,701
1,751
1,801
1,851
1,901
1,951
2,001
2,101
2,201
2,301
2,401
2,501
2,601
2,701
2,801
2,901
3,001
3,101
3,201
3,301
3,401

2

103
106
110
113
117
121
124
128
132
135
139
143
146
154
161
168
176
183
190
198
205
212
220
227
234
242
249
256
264
271
278
286
293
308
319
328
336
345
354
362
371
380
388
397
406
414
423
431

190
197
204
211
218
224
231
238
245
251
258
265
272
285
299
313
326
340
353
367
381
394
408
421
435
449
462
476
489
503
517
530
544
571
592
608
625
641
658
674
691
707
724
740
756
773
789
804

Number of Children
3
4

5

6

207
214
221
229
236
263
277
291
305
319
333
347
361
389
417
444
454
475
496
516
537
558
579
600
620
641
662
683
704
723
736
750
752
779
807
835
862
882
909
937
964
992

209
216
223
231
238
265
279
294
308
322
336
350
364
393
421
449
460
484
508
532
556
580
605
629
653
677
701
725
749
771
786
800
813
833
862
891
921
942
972

lb

From

676
701
726
751
776
801
826
851
876
901
926
951
976

1

—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

700
725
750
775
800
825
850
875
900
925
950
975
1,000
1,050
1,100
1,150
1,200
1,250
1,300
1,350
1,400
1,450
1,500
1,550
1,600
1,650
1,700
1,750
1,800
1,850
1,900
1,950
2,000
2,100
2,200
2,300
2,400
2,500
2,600
2,700
2,800
2,900
3,000
3,100
3,200
3,300
3,400
3,500

198
205
212
219
226
243
253
263
274
284
294
305
315
335
356
377
387
403
418
433
448
463
478
493
509
524
539
554
569
584
597
610
622
643
666
687
708
725
746
767
788
809
830
851
872
893
914
934

205
212
220
227
234
261
275
289
303
316
330
344
358
385
413
441
449
465
482
499
515
532
549
565
582
599
615
632
649
664
677
690
700
716
741
766
791
809
834
859
885
910
936
962
987
1,013
1,039
1,064

1,020
1,048
1,076
1,103
1,131
1,159

1,001
1,031
1,060
1,090
1,120
1,149
1,179
1,208
1,238
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Monthly Combined
Adj. Gross Income
From

1

2

438
444
451
458
465
472
479
486
493
499
506
513
520
527
534
541
547
554
561
568
575
582
586
591
596
601
605
610
615
620
624
629
629
673
680
687
694
701
706
710
715
719
723
728
732
737
741
746

817
830
843
856
870
883
896
909
923
936
949
962
975
989
1,002
1,015
1,028
1,042
1,055
1,068
1,081
1,093
1,103
1,112
1,122
1,131
1,141
1,150
1,159
1,169
1,178
1,188
1,188
1,188
1,188
1,188
1,188
1,188
1,189
1,197
1,205
1,213
1,220
1,228
1,236
1,244
1,252
1,259

Number of Chil<
3
4

78-45-7.14

5

6

1,187
1,215
1,243
1,270
1,297
1,325
1,352
1,379
1,407
1,443
1,470
1,498
1,525
1,552
1,580
1,607
1,634
1,658
1,682
1,706
1,730
1,754
1,778
1,802
1,826
1,850
1,874
1,897
1,921
1,951
1,975
1,998
1,998
1,998
1,998
1,998
1,998
1,998
1,998
1,998
1,998
1,998
1,998
1,998
2,000
2,013
2,026
2,039

1,268
1,297
1,327
1,356
1,386
1,415
1,444
1,474
1,503
1,541
1,570
1,600
1,629
1,658
1,687
1,717
1,746
1,772
1,797
1,823
1,848
1,874
1,899
1,925
1,950
1,976
2,001
2,026
2,052
2,084
2,109
2,134
2,134
2,134
2,134
2,134
2,134
2,134
2,134
2,134
2,134
2,134
2,134
2,137
2,150
2,164
2,178
2,192

To

3,501 — 3,600
3,601 — 3,700
3,701 — 3,800
3,801 — 3,900
3,901 — 4,000
4,001 — 4,100
4,101 — 4,200
4,201 — 4,300
4,301 — 4,400
4,401 — 4,500
4,501 — 4,600
4,601 — 4,700
4,701 — 4,800
4,801 — 4,900
4,901 — 5,000
5,001 — 5,100
5,101 — 5,200
5,201 — 5,300
5,301 — 5,400
5,401 — 5,500
5,501 — 5,600
5,601 — 5,700
5,701 — 5,800
5,801 — 5,900
5,901 — 6,000
6,001 — 6,100
6,101 — 6,200
6,201 — 6,300
6,301 — 6,400
6,401 — 6,500
6,501 — 6,600
6,601 — 6,700
6,701 — 6,800
6,801 — 6,900
6,901 — 7,000
7,001 — 7,100
7,101 — 7,200
7,201 — 7,300
7,301 — 7,400
7,401 — 7,500
7,501 — 7,600
7,601 — 7,700
7,701 — 7,800
7,801 - 7,900
7,901 — 8,000
8,001 — 8,100
8,101 — 8,200
8,201 — 8,300

953
973
992
1,012
1,031
1,050
1,069
1,088
1,107
1,131
1,150
1,169
1,188
1,207
1,226
1,245
1,264
1,282
1,300
1,317
1,335
1,351
1,367
1,383
1,398
1,414
1,430
1,445
1,461
1,480
1,495
1,511
1,511
1,511
1,511
1,511
1,511
1,520
1,531
1,541
1,551
1,562
1,572
1,582
1,592
1,603
1,613
1,623

1,090
1,116
1,141
1,167
1,192
1,217
1,242
1,267
1,292
1,326
1,350
1,375
1,400
1,425
1,450
1,475
1,500
1,522
1,544
1,566
1,588
1,610
1,632
1,653
1,675
1,697
1,719
1,740
1,762
1,791
1,812
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,841
1,853
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AJLJEL — Sexual partner's tort liability to
other partner for fraudulent misrepresentation
regarding sterility or use of birth control resulting in pregnancy, 2 A.L.R.5th 301.

Parent's child support liability as affected by
other parent's fraudulent misrepresentation regarding sterility or use of birth control, or
refusal to abort pregnancy, 2 A.L.R.5th 337.

78-45-7. Determination of amount of support — Rebuttable guidelines.
(1) (a) Prospective support shall be equal to the amount granted by prior
court order unless there has been a material change of circumstance on
the part of the obligor or obligee.
(b) If the prior court order contains a stipulated provision for the
automatic adjustment for prospective support, the prospective support
shall be the amount as stated in the order, without a showing of a material
change of circumstances, if the stipulated provision:
(i) is clear and unambiguous;
(ii) is self-executing;
(iii) provides for support which equals or exceeds the base child
support award required by the guidelines; and
(iv) does not allow a decrease in support as a result of the obligor's
voluntary reduction of income.
(2) If no prior court order exists, or a material change in circumstances has
occurred, the court determining the amount of prospective support shall
require each party to file a proposed award of child support using the
guidelines before an order awarding child support or modifying an existing
award may be granted.
(3) If the court finds sufficient evidence to rebut the guidelines, the court
shall establish support after considering all relevant factors, including but not
limited to:
(a) the standard of living and situation of the parties;
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties;
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn;
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn;
(e) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child;
(f) the ages of the parties; and
(g) the responsibilities of the obligor and the obligee for the support of
others.
(4) When no prior court order exists, the court shall determine and assess all
arrearages based upon the Uniform Child Support Guidelines described in this
chapter.
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 7; 1977, ch.
145, § 10;1984,ch.l3,§ 2; 1989, ch. 214, § 3;
1990, ch. 100, § 2; 1994, ch. 118, § 2; 1994,
ch. 140, § 14.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment by ch. 140, effective May 2, 1994, substituted "the Uniform Child Support Guidelines
described in this chapter" for "but not limited
to: (a) the amount of public assistance received
by the obligee, if any; and (b) the funds that

have been reasonably and necessarily expended in support of spouse and children" at
the end of Subsection (4).
The 1994 amendment by ch. 118, effective
July 1, 1994, designated former Subsection (1)
as Subsection (l)(a) and added Subsection
(l)(b).
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
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Marilyn M. Branch
C:::, of the Court

Karen Penrose,
ORDER
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No. 950774-CA
v.
Jeffrey Penrose,
Defendant and Appellee.

This matter is before the court upon its own motion.
By order, dated March 27, 1996, this court dismissed the
appeal due to appellant's failure to file her brief. It has now
come to the court's attention that such order was issued due to
clerical error.
Now, therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the order of
dismissal, dated March 27, 1996, is vacated and the appeal is
reinstated.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that appellant's brief shall be filed
and served by May 17, 1996. This due date takes into
consideration the three days mailing provision of Rule 22(d),
Utah R. App. P.
Dated this

7

day o f April, 1996

FOR THE COURT:

^k~Ji^

Michael J . W i l k m s ,

Judge

